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Introduction
In Ways of Worldmaking (1978), Nelson Goodman presents his view on the existence of a 
plurality of not discovered worlds that are constructed from previous worlds. His aim is to reject 
several thesis associated whith metaphysical realism. The most common version of realism seems 
to include three beliefs: (i) there is a single world; (ii) the world is independent of mind and lan-
guage; (iii) there is a single true complete description of the world. Faced with these beliefs, Good-
man postulates the existence of a plurality of worlds shaped by a variety of forms of organization 
imposed by ourselves, a multifaceted variety of constructed worlds. Goodman called “irrealism” 
his position and presented it as “a radical relativism under rigorous restraints” (Goodman, 1978, 
p. x). He later characterized it as an intermediate position between anti-realism and anti-idealism 
(Goodman, 1996, p. 203). 
His criticism of the idea of  an independent world is also combined with a rejection of the 
correspondence theory of truth, which he considers as an essential component of traditional 
realism. Several very different theories have been offered to explain the concept of truth, but 
concerning the aims of this paper it will be necessary to refer only to the conception of truth as 
correspondence and the coherence theory of truth.
The correspondence theory of truth, broadly speaking, argues that there is a relationship of 
agreement or conformity between a belief or a statement and a fact. One of the first formulations 
cited in this regard is that of Aristotle: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it 
is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true” (Metaphysics, 
1011b25). Given Aristotle’s metaphysical convictions on the existence of an independent reality, 
the correspondence theory is usually associated with metaphysical realism. While some authors 
have emphasized the metaphysical aspect pointing out that what is important is the conformi-
ty between what is claimed and reality, others take in account that Aristotle does not explic-
itly mention such a relationship of correspondence and favor a semantic interpretation that is 
summed up in the idea of that what the statement means exists.
Coherence theories of truth state that truth is a relationship between propositions, in prin-
ciple, consistency between them. Thus, a proposition is true to the extent that it can coherently 
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be included in a system of propositions. We do not find here 
any reference to facts or objects to which these propositions 
have to be accommodated.
Goodman’s explicit relativism resulting from the thesis 
of the existence of a plurality of worlds, suggests, as himself 
does, that his ideas can’t be reconciled with truth as corre-
spondence. This suggests that it could be attributed to him 
an inclination towards a coherence theory of truth. But, as we 
shall see, the situation is not necessarily so.
It is true that Goodman argues for relativism. But this 
is not a radical relativism, not everything goes, because we 
always start from a previous version or from some old world 
(Goodman, 1978, p. 97). Goodman introduces here two terms 
– “world” and “version” – which have promted some objections. 
Indeed, on the one hand, Goodman postulates a plurality of 
worlds; on the other hand, he claims that there is a plurality of 
versions. There can be no further doubt, then, that world and 
version are different things. One would think that given some 
world (whether unique or not) it can be provided different 
descriptions of that world, and each of them would be a ver-
sion of that world. However, Goodman often seems to confuse 
both concepts, as will be shown below. Furthermore, a version 
is considered true only if it does not violate any belief firmly 
believed by us, nor transgress any rules or guidelines associated 
with them. This has led many authors to think that that coher-
entism is the only criterion underlying Goodman’s conception 
of truth. This paper analyzes exactly this issue. The main ques-
tion is whether Goodman ultimately sticks to a coherence con-
ception of truth or whether there is still room for a correspon-
dentist version of the truth, despite his explicit rejection of this. 
In what follows, I will restrict the discussion to worlds involving 
the notion of truth; I will put aside the metaphorical, artistic, 
undeclarative versions where Goodman prefers to speak of 
“correction” instead of “truth” (Goodman, 1984, p. 196).
I will argue that Goodman associates the notion of corre-
spondence exclusively with the perspective of traditional meta-
physical realism that he refuses. Although I will not plead for or 
against irrealism, I will argue that it is perfectly possible to rec-
oncile pluralism with a correspondence theory of truth. I think 
that unless pluralism and the correspondence theory of truth 
can be combined, Goodman’s position is incomprehensible due 
to special restrictions that he imposes to pluralism.
Relativism versus Absolutism
In “The Way the World Is” (1960), Nelson Goodman 
presents his peculiar pluralism as the polar opposite of “ab-
solutism” (Goodman, 1960, p. 56). From this perspective, he 
formulates his criticism of the picture theory of language and 
underlying assumptions about “the given world”, something 
with order and structure that language reflects like a photo-
graph or a copy. According to Goodman, the structure of a 
description could not conform to the structure of the world, 
for there is no such thing as the structure of the world. There 
is no way that is the way the world is. The question of how 
the world is becomes meaningless since there is no single real 
world that is independent of us. Goodman rejects both the 
picture theory of language and the theory of truth under-
stood as a correspondence between language and the world as 
it is usually associated with traditional realism. 
However, it is not the idea of  a plurality of worlds and 
the rejection of the correspondence theory associated with 
realism that makes Goodman’s position attractive. These 
ideas have some antecedents in the history of philosophy. The 
peculiarity of Goodman’s doctrine resides in the fact that the 
plurality of constructed worlds allows for the coexistence of 
incompatible versions, all of which are true. Goodman him-
self asks the following questions: In just what sense are there 
many worlds? And what is the relation between worlds and 
versions? He answers these questions in different chapters of 
Ways of Worldmaking.
Goodman’s worlds are worlds built into the various 
disciplines, such as physics, psychology, music, biology, visual 
arts, etc. The symbolic forms through which worlds are con-
structed go beyond the limits set by theories, descriptions, 
statements, and language; they include not only literal but 
metaphorical, pictorial, and musical versions.
An important point is that Goodman denies that the 
plurality of versions is a set of versions of the same events. 
That is, the statements (i) “The Earth always stands still” and 
(ii) “The Earth dances the role of Petrouchka” appear to con-
flict because each implies the negation of the other. However, 
according to Goodman, although both versions are incom-
patible, both are true in different worlds: the first in the Ptol-
emaic world and the second in a Stravinskian world (Good-
man, 1978, p. 111).
Although the notion of a plurality of worlds seems far 
from Kantian, Goodman acknowledges an affinity with re-
gard to the idea “that the notion of pure content is an empty 
notion” (Goodman, 1978, p. 6). It is contradictory to speak 
of an unstructured or no-conceptualized content, a substrate 
that lacks properties, since this way of speaking already con-
ceptualizes the object and imposes properties and structures. 
Kant said that perceptions without concepts are blind and 
concepts without perceptions are empty. Goodman says that 
“we can have words without a world but no world without 
words or other symbols” (Goodman, 1978, p. 6).
The peculiar constructivism of Goodman’s pluralism is 
apparent in the title of the sixth chapter of Ways of Worldmak-
ing: “The Fabrication of Facts”.
My title, ‘The Fabrication of Facts’, has the 
virtue not only of indicating pretty clearly 
what I am going to discuss but also of irri-
tating those fundamentalists who know very 
well that facts are found not made, that 
facts constitute the one and only real world, 
and that knowledge consists of believing 
the facts. These articles of faith so firmly 
possess most of us, they so bind and blind 
us, that ‘fabrication of fact’ has a paradoxi-
cal sound (Goodman, 1978, p. 91).
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However paradoxical it may seem, the forms of orga-
nization “are not ‘found in the world’ but built into a world” 
(Goodman, 1978, p. 14) through processes such as compo-
sition and decomposition, weighting, sorting, deletion, sup-
plementation, deformation, and others. To illustrate just one 
of these, let’s take the case of the mechanism of ordering: 
“Worlds not differing in entities or emphasis may differ in 
ordering” (Goodman, 1978, p. 12). So, for instance, from a 
world composed of three elements we can build another, say 
a Leśniewskian world, of seven or eight elements.
Accepting the existence of countless alternative versions 
does not however mean that anything goes: the recognition that 
there are many alternative versions does not mean adoppting a 
laissez faire policy. Goodman recognizes the normative value of 
criteria for distinguishing the correct version from wrong ver-
sions. We can not build a correct version by chance; worlds are 
not “made” by chance, for we always start with some old ver-
sion or some old world, to which we are “tied”: “Worldmaking 
begins with one version and ends with another” (Goodman, 
1978, p. 97). Among these old worlds there are those config-
ured according to the laws of logic or those resulting from some 
perceptions3, or others still built from convictions or prejudices 
impregnated with varying degrees of firmness. Thus, Good-
man seems to put some brake on the imagination and avoids 
committing himself to a complete relativism.
We can ask whether Goodman’s constructivism belongs 
to the epistemic level or, on the contrary, whether it reaches the 
realm of ontology. We will discuss this issue in the next section.
Worldmaking or versionmaking?
Goodman’s pluralism led Israel Scheffler to wonder 
whether building worlds is simply building versions, descrip-
tions or other representations. Thus, in “The Wonderful 
Worlds of Goodman” (1980), Scheffler charges Goodman 
with using the notion of world ambiguously: on the one hand, 
there is a versional interpretation, where a world is just a true 
(or correct) version; on the other hand, there is an objectual 
interpretation where a world is a realm of things described or 
referred by a correct version. In the latter case, talking about 
worlds would not be simply talking about conflicting versions. 
Scheffler stresses that Goodman insists on “multiple actual 
worlds” and that this should not “be passed over as purely 
rhetorical” (Scheffler, 1980, p. 201).
Each of these interpretations is supported by Good-
man’s claims, which Scheffler quotes as grounds for his criti-
cism. Concerning the identification of worlds with versions, 
Scheffler stresses Goodman’s words: “With false hope of a 
firm foundation gone, with the world displaced by worlds that 
are but versions […] we face the questions how worlds are 
made, tested, and known” (Goodman, 1978, p. 7 in Scheffler, 
1980, p. 202, Scheffler’s emphasis). Without doubt Good-
man is here thinking of worlds and versions as the same kind 
of things. Scheffler quotes many passages with this use of the 
term “world”.
As for the objectual interpretation, Scheffler quotes 
passages in which Goodman used the term “world” together 
with expressions such as “real” and “refer”. Talk of the “real 
world” or of “versions that refer and versions that do not re-
fer” seems to admit only the objectual interpretation with 
respect the term world. In addition, Scheffler quotes passag-
es in which Goodman alludes to worlds as constituting the 
field of application of predicates or areas of things to which 
versions apply.
In other fragments, the versional interpretation and the 
objectual interpretation come together. In order to support 
his conclusion, Scheffler mentions the following example:
“Of course”, he writes, “we want to distin-
guish between versions that do and those 
that do not refer, and to talk about the 
things and worlds, if any, referred to: but 
these things and worlds and even the stuff 
they are made of-matter, anti-matter, mind, 
energy, or what not-are fashioned along 
with the versions themselves” (p. 96) (Schef-
fler, 1980, p. 205).
Nevertheless, there is a problema here because the quo-
tation is not absolutly accurate.4 On the page mentioned by 
Scheffler (p. 96), Goodman’s words were: 
Of course, we want to distinguish between 
versions that do and those that do not refer, 
and to talk about the things and worlds, if 
any, referred to; but these things and worlds 
and even the stuff they are made of-matter, 
anti-matter, mind, energy, or whatnot-are 
fashioned along with the things and worlds 
themselves (Goodman, 1978, p. 96).
3 One might think that a plurality of versions, including those that are incompatible but equally admissible with respect to a certain 
world, might be assimilated to the theoretical pluralism advocated by van Fraassen. Incompatible versions would resemble the incom-
patibility of theories that could be, nevertheless, empirically equivalent and therefore equally sustainable. However, there are important 
differences between the two authors. In van Fraassen’s case, his attitude is realistic about the observable world and even though he 
admits the coexistence of incompatible theories does not think that more than one of them are true. Moreover, the condition required 
by van Fraassen, empirical adequacy, refers to the truth of the theory with respect to all observable phenomena that would make up a 
unique world. So, for instance, if a scientific theory T1 and a scientific theory T2 say incompatible things about unobservable aspects of 
the world but both theories agree concerning all directly observable phenomena, van Fraassen would say that only one of them could 
be true. On the contrary, Goodman would say that both theories could be simultaneously true, each one concerning it respective world, 
and the two worlds (among many others) are real.
4 I thank an anonimous reviewer for pointing to me Scheffler’s mistake quoting Goodman.
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Scheffler seems to have commited a mistake. But we can 
ask what Goodmans’s words mean. To say that worlds and 
things are fashioned along with the things and worlds them-
selves seems to be a kind of tautology. Perhaps Goodman 
wanted to reinforce the fact that things and worlds are always 
constructed. But, any way the confusión of concept of worlds 
and the concept of versión remain. Recall that as we noted 
above Goodman says that we build worlds from old versions. 
So, eventually, Scheffler seems to be rigth in attributing an 
ambiguous use of both concepts.
Scheffler then states his central criticism: “Now the 
claim that it is we who made the stars by making the word 
‘star’ I consider absurd, taking this claim in its plain and liter-
al sense” (Scheffler, 1980, p. 205). According to Scheffler, this 
amounts to confusing speech features with aspects of what 
speech refers to; and it even collides with Goodman’s distinc-
tion between a version and that to which the version refers.
Sheffler concludes that Goodman cannot say “we make 
worlds by making versions”, as he does (Goodman, 1978, 
p. 94) and that, in spite of Goodman’s disclaimer (Goodman, 
1978, p. 110), objectual talk of worldmaking had better be tak-
en as “purely rhetorical” (Scheffler, 1980, p. 208).
Pluralism and correspondentism
Goodman does not abandon the concept of truth but re-
iterates time and again that he does not use the notion of truth 
in a correspondentist way. From this insistence, many readers 
have drawn the conclusion that the only criterion of truth un-
derlying Goodman’s pluralism is plain coherentism. Thus, in 
“Comments on Goodman’s Way of Worldmaking” (1980), 
Hempel compares Goodman’s thesis with that of Neurath:
But Neurath’s formulationsand I think to 
some extent Goodman’sgive rise to the 
uneasy feeling that we are being offered a 
coherence theory of knowledge, in which 
simplicity, scope, and coherence are the dom-
inant requirements for acceptable theories; 
and one wonders how the empirical character 
of scientific claims or versions is accommo-
dated in this conception of making version 
from version and adjudicating proposed hy-
potheses by their fit with the accepted system 
(Hempel, 1980, p. 196, my emphasis).
We must admit that many claims, as well as the name 
that Goodman chooses for his doctrine, “irrealism”, suggest 
a coherentist reading. However, if coherentism was the only 
criterion for differentiating true versions from those that are 
not true, then it would be pointless to distinguish, for exam-
ple, the factual from the fictional, as Goodman actually does:
‘Fabrication’ has become a synonym for 
‘falsehood’ or ‘fiction’ as contrasted with 
‘truth’ or ‘fact’. Of course, we must distin-
guish falsehood and fiction from truth and 
fact; but we cannot, I am sure, do it on the 
ground that fiction is fabricated and fact 
found (Goodman 1978, p. 91, my emphasis).
I would like to offer a different interpretation. I think 
we ought pay attention to some passages in which Goodman 
makes explicit his agreement with Kant:
I think of this book as belonging in that 
mainstream of modern philosophy that be-
gan when Kant exchanged the structure 
of the world for the structure of the mind, 
continued when C. I. Lewis exchanged the 
structure of the mind for the structure of con-
cepts, and that now proceeds to exchange 
the structure of concepts for the structure of 
the several symbol systems of the sciences, 
philosophy, the arts, perception, and every-
day discourse. The movement is from unique 
truth and a world fixed and found to a diver-
sity of right and even conflicting versions or 
worlds in the making (Goodman, 1978, p. x).
Furthermore, when he refers to the plurality of worlds 
and the impossibility of a unique, unconceptualized given 
world, Goodman again stresses his affinity (in spite of some 
differences) with Kant:
The non-Kantian theme of a multiplicity of 
worlds is closely akin to the Kantian theme 
of the vacuity of the notion of pure content. 
The one denies us a unique world, the other 
the common stuff of which worlds are made. 
Together these theses defy our intuitive de-
mand for something stolid underneath, and 
threaten to leave us uncontrolled, spinning 
out our own inconsequent fantasies.
The overwhelming case against percep-
tion without conception, the pure given, 
absolute immediacy, the innocent eye, 
substance as substratum, has been so fully 
and frequently set forth by Berkeley, Kant, 
Cassirer, Gombrich, Bruner, and many oth-
ersas to need no restatement here. Talk 
of unstructured content or an unconceptu-
alized given or a substratum without prop-
erties is self-defeating; for the talk imposes 
structure, conceptualizes, ascribes proper-
ties (Goodman, 1978, p. 6).
The belief that the notion of a pure content is empty is 
also shared by Putnam, who holds a similar position in em-
bracing internal realism (Putnam, 1981). Recall too that in 
Realism with a Human Face (1992 [1990]) Putnam refutes the 
idea of a “given” in the following terms: 
But the idea that we sometimes compare 
our beliefs directly with unconceptualized 
reality […] has come to seem untenable. Ac-
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cess to the world is through our discourse 
and the role that discourse plays in our lives; 
we compare our discourse with the world as 
it is presented to us or constructed for us by 
discourse itself, making in the process new 
worlds out of old ones; and a psychological 
act of comparing our discourse with things 
as they are in themselves has come to have 
the status of a ‘mystery act’ (Putnam, 1992 
[1990], p. 121, my emphasis).
If one were to read this passage without knowing the au-
thor, one might think that it was written by Goodman. Note 
the idea that we make worlds out of old ones. And also note 
his rejection of the correspondence theory of truth: 
If objects are […] theory-dependent, then 
the whole idea of truth’s being defined or 
explained in terms of a correspondence’ 
between items in a language and items in 
a fixed theory-independent reality has to 
be given up. The picture I propose instead 
is not the picture of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism, but it is certainly related to it (Put-
nam, 1992 [1990], p. 41).
Given these similarities, and given that Putnam recog-
nizes the Kantian roots of his philosophy, why didn’t he pick 
up the Kantian notion of truth? As McDermid documents it, 
Kant explicitly supports the correspondence theory of truth 
in the Critique of Pure Reason. There he says that truth consist 
“in the agreement of knowledge with its object” (Kant, 1999 
[1781], A 58, A 191; McDermid, 1998, p. 17). Likewise, Kant 
conceived truth as the “the conformity of our concepts with 
the object” (Kant, 1999 [1781], A 642/B 670; McDermid, 
1998, p. 18).5
According to McDermid, it would wrong to believe 
that the criterion for the correspondence of truth can only 
be maintained under the assumption that facts are indepen-
dent of the mind. McDermid notes that Kant shows precisely 
that the rejection of the “given” is perfectly compatible with 
a correspondence definition of truth. So McDermid asserts 
that it is posible to reconcile correspondence with antirealism 
(McDermid, 1998, p. 27).
I think that McDermid’s interpretation is perfectly ap-
plicable to Goodman’s theory. Recall that in “The Way the 
World Is”, Goodman crystallizes his criticism of the idea of a 
mind- and speech-independent “given” world. And in Ways of 
Worldmaking, he once again attacks the view he has charac-
terized as a form of absolutism and the correspondence the-
ory of truth with which it is associated. But note that Good-
man seems to make the same mistake McDermid attributes 
to Putnam in leaving aside Kant’s recognition of a version of 
the correspondence theory of truth. Why should we assume 
that the correspondence theory implies the existence of an 
independent, non-conceptualized world? Why can’t we rec-
oncile the plurality of constructed worlds with a correspon-
dence notion of truth? 
Truth as correspondence can be understood en several 
ways. As we have seen above, correspondence admits at least 
two meanings: an eminently metaphysical sense, committed 
to the existence of an independent reality, and a semantic 
sense which only says that what a true proposition means 
exists. This second meaning of the notion of correspondence 
can be the bridge to reconcile Goodman’s ontological plural-
ism with the notion of truth as correspondence.
A similar idea is presented by Peter Ludlow concerning 
Chomsky’s doctrine (Ludlow, 2003). According to Ludlow, 
as the extent as for Chomsky language is not identified with 
something spoken or written but with an internal state that 
is part of our biological endowment, it would seem that he is 
obliged to reject the referential semantics since it expresses 
relationships between linguistic representations and aspects 
of the world which are external to the agent. However, Lud-
low noted that Chomsky’s position is not incompatible with a 
referentialist semantics per se but with the idea that there is an 
isomorphism between language and the world. If both issues, 
the possibility of reference, on the one hand, and the isomor-
phism, on the other hand, are separated, then the possibility 
of combining Chomsky’s ideas with a referential semantics 
remains open.
Also, in our case, the compatibility between the aban-
donment of an independently estructured given world and 
truth as correspondence is plausible. The semantic version of 
the correspondence is akin to Goodman’s insistence on that 
“we can have words without a world but no world without 
words or other symbols” (Goodman, 1978, p. 6).
To show the compatibility of a plurality of construct-
ed worlds with a correspondence theory of truth we must 
stop associating correspondence with a world of independent 
events. Instead, we have to introduce the semantic concep-
tion of truth just explained and to apply it to plurality of 
worlds. Granted that a world is built nothing prevent us to 
understand the truth as correspondence; and there is no rea-
son to abandone this idea if instead of one world we build 
many. Although there are no unconceptualized facts and we 
can speak of facts only from within a conceptual framework, 
from within a version, to use Goodman’s words, and although 
as Quine says, ontology is always theoretically dependent, this 
situation does not force us to abandon the correspondence 
criterion of truth.
5 McDermid quoted also  other occurrences of Kantian definition of  truth: “The truth is the agreement of cognition with its object” 
(Kant, 1992b [1800], p. 557; McDermid, 1998, p. 18); “If a cognition does not agree with the character of the thing that we want to 
represent and to cognize, then it is false, in that it cannot subsist with truth. If on the other hand a cognition is in conformity with the 
character of the thing that we represent, then it is true” (Kant, 1992a [1770], p. 61; McDermid, 1998, p. 18).
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I think that my Kantian/Putnamian reading of Good-
man’s doctrine allows us to articulate and reconcile passages 
from Goodman that would otherwise make his position in-
comprehensible. A purely coherentist reading of Goodman’s 
position does not harmonize with the restrictions he im-
posed to the act of world making: “a radical relativism under 
rigorous restraints”, to use his own words. And among these 
restrictions he includes the need to recognize some percep-
tions. But this reinforces the idea that he adheres to some 
sort of correspondence. 
If the interpretation outlined here is accepted, we can 
admit that the worlds of science can be built, that there is 
a plurality of worlds, but the truth of each scientific version 
depends on correspondence with the “facts”, although those 
facts are also part of a constructed world. And consequently, 
the cojunction of pluralism and correspondence might more 
apropriately characterize, at least in a sustainable way, the ir-
realism that Goodman attempts to develop.
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